abstract
■ as north korea’s nuclear capabilities grow more sophisticated, the need for a broader range of military response options has been increasingly emphasized, with nuclear‑powered submarines emerging as a compelling alternative.
- alongside options such as the redeployment of u.s. tactical nuclear weapons, indigenous nuclear armament, and the development of latent nuclear capabilities, nuclear‑powered submarines are highlighted as a means of alleviating security anxieties arising from north korea’s nuclear strike threats.
■ nuclear‑powered submarines are widely regarded as asymmetric deterrent assets: mobile undersea bases capable of prolonged submerged operations, including surveillance and reconnaissance, that can survive a nuclear first strike and still execute retaliatory missions.
- operationally, they are also viewed as the most effective platform for countering the submarine-launched ballistic missile (slbm) force north korea is expected to field.1
■ south korea is generally considered capable of constructing nuclear‑powered submarines, but stable access to nuclear fuel would hinge on cooperation from the united states and other key actors in the global non‑proliferation regime.
■ this report analyzes nuclear‑powered submarine acquisition by latecomer states beyond the p5 and examines the key issues that would arise if south korea pursued a similar program, with a view to deriving policy implications.
- under the second trump administration, tougher negotiations are expected on alliance issues such as defense cost‑sharing and the future of u.s. forces korea, creating an opportunity to reconsider bargaining strategies within the alliance x-framework.
