

2021 여름 | 제 21권 2호(통권82호)

ISSN 2466-2259

국가안보와 전략

NATIONAL SECURITY AND STRATEGY

Abstract

Europe's Nuclear Decision in the 1960s: Implication for the ROK's Tailored Deterrence Strategy

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Since North Korea's advancement of nuclear capabilities stirred up a credibility issue of the US nuclear umbrella, various debates have been underway as to strengthening the ROK's indigenous deterrence capabilities. The most analogous precedent were the cases of France, West Germany, and the UK in the 1960s following the Soviet Union's nuclear development, and it can be said that counter-decisions of these countries differed substantially depending on their respective focuses, namely either pre-war deterrence or damage limitation. The operational utility of the ROK's countermeasure package, represented by the Three-Axis System, also needs to be readjusted in consistency with precise principles for this question of deterrence concept.

Key Words: Pre-war Deterrence, Damage Limitation, Three-Axis System, Korea
Massive Punishment and Retaliation, Extended Deterrence

투고일: 2021.05.07. 심사일: 2021.06.01. 게재확정일: 2021.06.15.

Abstract

International Financial Institution's Aid Conditionality and Implications for Development Cooperation with North Korea

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North Korea has maintained military and security tensions with neighboring countries over the issue of ‘denuclearization’ even after the Kim Jongun regime emerged. However, the international community, including South Korea, needs to consider various scenarios for socioeconomic and political changes in North Korea. In this context, the study sought to analyze the ‘aid conditionality’, which is prerequisite for financial aid to North Korea by international financial institutions(IFIs). To this end, examined were the definition of ‘aid conditionality’, the process of application, related policy discussions and major issues. The present study also analyzed key principles of conditionality proposed by the IFIs such as national ownership, collaborations and coordination among the IFIs, clarification of the conditionality and so on. On top of that, the study investigated the contents of major implementation conditionality such as partnership between donor and recipient countries, willingness and past achievements of recipient countries, cooperation and harmonization between donor countries/organizations. Finally, the implications for North Korea were derived by analyzing the

characteristics of these implementation of conditionalities applied to developing countries, transition countries, and low-income stress countries (LICUS).

Key Words: International Finance Institutions(IFIs), World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Conditionality, North Korea, Development Effectiveness

투고일: 2021.05.09. 심사일: 2021.06.02. 제재확정일: 2021.06.15.

Abstract

Japan–Europe Security Cooperation in the Indo–Pacific

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Recently, European countries deepen engagement on the Indo-Pacific. Japan as well advocates the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy(FOIP) while expanding its security cooperation with the EU. The background behind broadening security cooperation between Japan and the Europe for the Indo-Pacific region is as follows.

First, the U.K., France, Germany and the Netherlands among the European countries that have been closely related to the region from the past signal their interests in the Indo-Pacific. Second, China's increasing military presence in the Indo-Pacific is perceived as assertive. Third, the U.S. has sought to strengthen U.S.-Europe-Japan trilateral cooperation with the advent of the Biden administration.

Against this backdrop, the characteristics of Japan-Europe security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region are as follows.

First, Japan's pursuit of partnership with Europe in the region has been largely affected by U.S. foreign policy. Japan promotes active political cooperation with the U.S. as the two share the common objective of keeping China in check in a U.S.-China Strategic competition under the Biden administration while pursing security cooperation with the Europe in the Indo-Pacific amid concerns over the U.S. less engaged in the region as a

result of Trump's "America First".

Second, European countries take a different approach when dealing with China while seeing it as being a greater threat with China's growing military power causing instability in the region because their economic ties with China remain important, having difficulty responding to China on security issues.

South Korea has not yet shown its opinions on the U.S.-Japan led FOIP strategy and China's One Belt One Road Initiative. The fact that almost all fields including international security, economy, science and technology divide international orders into pro-China and anti-China is too heavy a burden for a country pursuing the Peace Process on the Korean peninsula. Against this backdrop, it should seek to engage in both strategies actively and selectively based on transparency and openness given China's role for a peaceful settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue including denuclearization.

Key Words: Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan, Europe, Security Cooperation

투고일: 2021.05.08. 심사일: 2021.06.02. 제재확정일: 2021.06.15.

Abstract

The EU Cyber Restrictive Measures as a Regime for Collective Retorsion: Its Implications for South Korea's Cybersecurity

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South Korea has attributed several cyber incidents to North Korea, including 7.7 DDoS Attack in 2009, 3.4 DDoS Attack in 2011, Cyber Attack on NH Bank in 2011, 3.20 Cyber Terror in 2013. However, it has not taken any response against North Korea. Moreover, even though Russia's military intelligence agency, GRU, was blamed by the US and UK in October 2020 for the operation targeting the 2018 PyeongChang Olympic Games, the South Korean government still remains silent. Continuous inaction of South Korea, however, could give its potential aggressors wrong messages regarding South Korea's cyber capability or will for response. The South Korean government should seek feasible ways to ensure that the proportionate cost for malicious acts targeting the ROK should be paid. Considering the challenges South Korea encounters in response to malicious cyber operations, collective response rather than unilateral one could be a more realistic option. In this regard, the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox and its restrictive measures in particular, considered as retorsion, can offer ideas for such a collective response regime. Therefore, this Article examines the values of the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox as collective retorsion and draws lessons from it for

response of the ROK against malicious cyber operations.

Key Words: Retorsion, Countermeasures, Attribution, Sanction, the European Union, Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, Cybersecurity, Restrictive Measures

투고일: 2021.05.07. 심사일: 2021.06.02. 제재확정일: 2021.06.15.

Abstract

North Korea’s “Our State First” Slogan and Cultural Arts Using Contents Based on the National Flag

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North Korea’s “Our State First” is a political slogan of the Kim Jong-un regime and its highest level of ideology. The slogan first appeared officially in a *Rodong Shinmun* article on the test launch of the Hwasong 15 in 2017. Then, the slogan’s significance was reconfirmed in Kim Jong-un’s New Year Address on January 1, 2019. Achieving “great victory and outstanding accomplishments that the world looks up to” and thereby building “national strength and stature” to enable the people to have “pride in the greatness of the socialist fatherland” was defined as the national goal. Starting from the 7th Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in 2016, the regime re-established itself as a normal socialist state led by the leadership of the party. Operating as a normal state system led by the KWP, it declared that it would create a country where the “people can enjoy world-class civilization” through “breakthrough development.” The essence of “Our State First” is to have “pride that our country is the best country in the world.” The emphasis on “Our State First” has generated an increasing interest in national symbols. With patriotism at the fore, the regime is carrying out an extensive education on national symbols, including cultural education through

the arts. The Kim Jong-un regime's main emphasis in the re-establishment of the national symbol is centered on the national flag. "The Story of My House," a film released prior to the 7th Party Congress and "Our National Flag," a song introduced in *Rodong Shinmun* along with the declaration of the "Our State First" slogan, are model examples demonstrating the direction and meaning of "Our State First" in North Korea.

Key Words: North Korea, Kim Jong-un, North Korea's "Our State First", North Korean's national symbols, "The Story of My House"(North Korea's film), "Our National Flag"(North Korea's song)

투고일: 2021.05.02. 심사일: 2021.06.02. 게재확정일: 2021.06.15.

